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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the denial of Gerry Barcella's petition for post-conviction relief.
Clerk's Record (CR) 846.
B. Procedural History
In 1997, Gerry Barcella was found guilty of the 1995 first degree murder of William
Smith. He had been accused of killing Smith, the manager of the apartment building where they
both lived, by hitting him with a pulaski. 1 Although the state had sought the death penalty, Gerry
was sentenced to a term of life with 30 years fixed. CR 59-77.
A direct appeal was taken and the Court of AppeaJs found several errors. These included:
the improper admission of informant testimony wherein one informant testified that Gerry was
not worried that he would be convicted because he had gotten away with a couple of prior
shootings; the improper admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of a informant snitch
without a proper determination that he was an unavailable witness; and the improper exclusion of
testimony that would have impeached the improperly admitted preliminary hearing testimony.
However, all these euors were found harmless. Additionally, the Court of Appeals declined to
decide whether there was error in the late disclosure by the state of certain evidence, as the Court
found that even if there was enor any such error was not prejudicial. The Court further found no
error in the limitation on cross-examination of two of the state's primary witnesses, found no
basis for reversal of the conviction on the claim of cumulative enor, and found that the sentence

1

A pulaski is a single bit ax with an adze-shaped hoe extending from the back.
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pulaski.
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was not excessive. CR 59-77. State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191,. 16 P.3d 288 (Ct. App. 2000),

rev. denied, 2001.
Gerry then filed a prose petition for post-conviction relief. CR 1. His petition raised 29
claims for relief. These included:
1. Ineffective assistance of counsel;
2. Prosecutorial misconduct;
3. Violation of the right to access to the courts;
4. Violation of the right to due process;
5. Violation of constitutional rights by pre-trial decisions;
6. Violation of constitutional rights by the decisions and conduct of the trial judge;
7. Error in not granting a new trial motion;
8. The cumulative effect of errors of trial counsel;
9. The cumulative effect of the judges' wrongful decisions and conduct;
l 0. The cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct;
11. The cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors and the pretrial and trial judges'
wrongful decisions;
12. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel;
13. Use by the jury of information not in evidence to convict;
14. Violation of the 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination;
15. Trial court decisions which were unjust and manifestly inconsistent;
16. Violation of the 8th Amendment by an unfair process;
17. hnproper selection of the jury;
2

18. Improper jury instructions on first and second degree murder;
19. Improper selection of a jury pool;
20. Reliance by the jury on false and perjured testimony;

21. Error by the appellate court in not overturning the conviction and ordering a new trial
or immediate release;

22. Repeated denial of the right to confront and exan1ine witnesses;
23. Potential contamination of the jury pool by a prospective juror's comments;
24. Denial of the 6th Amendment right to confront witnesses;

25. Violation of the 14th Amendment right to due process;

26. Violation of the right to access to the courts;
27. Denial of a fair trial by a combination of all errors;
28. New evidence not disclosed at trial;

29. Unfair trial.
CR 40-46.

These claims were presented in detail in Gerry's 326 page prose petition. CR Vol. I.
And, they were supported by his 249 page prose affidavit. CR Vol. II. Gerry also filed a motion
for the appointment of counsel. CR 584.
Gerry's motion for counsel was granted and the Kootenai County Public Defender was
appointed. CR 588. Immediately thereafter, John Hull was appointed as conflict counsel. CR
589.

The state then filed its two page answer which included a blanket denial of all of Gerry's
allegations, a denial that there were any material facts not previously heard, and a denial that
3

Gerry received ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon this blanket denial which did not in
any way specifically address even one of Gerry's 29 claims, the state asked the court to dismiss
the petition. CR 591.
The state also filed a motion for summary disposition on the grounds that Gerry had filed
no affidavit, record, or other evidence supporting his allegations. This motion made no reference
to Gerry's 249 page affidavit. CR 594.
About a year later, when nothing new had been filed in the case, the state moved to
dismiss for failure to pursue the proceedings. CR 595. And, apparently as a result, Hull was
replaced with RolfKehne. CR 596. Kehne filed an objection to the state's motion to dismiss
asking the court to allow him time to become familiar with the case and investigate potential
claims. CR 598.
Kehne had the case from October 2002 until 2004, but did not file any pleadings.
However during this time, he successfully avoided attempts to dismiss the case for inactivity.
ROA 10/23/02- 9/27/04.
Then in November 2004, Gerry filed a prose affidavit seeking to vacate the order
appointing Kehne and to have new conflict counsel appointed as co-counsel to himself. In his
affidavit, he documented Kelme' s failure to work on the case and his failure to communicate
with Gerry. CR 608. 2
Thereafter, the court issued an order terminating representation by Kehne, and Michael

2

Four years later, on June 27, 2008, Rolf Kehne was suspended from the practice of
law for one year with all but 90 days withheld based in part upon his conduct in this case. After
the 90 day actual suspension, Kehne will be required to serve a two year probationary period.
See www2.state.id.us/isb.be/public_ discipline.htm.
4

Palmer was appointed to represent Gerry. CR 745, 748.
Soon thereafter Palmer filed an amended petition wherein he alleged that the judgment
and sentence were in violation of the state and federal constitutions, that prosecutorial
misconduct had resulted in a violation of due process, and that the conviction was subject to
collateral attack on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. He also included in full
Gerry's prior prose petition. CR 753, 757.

ln response, the state filed an answer to the amended petition which incorporated its
initial answer, denied all the allegations other than those in paragraphs 1-9 and 11 of the
amended petition, and asked that the amended petition be denied. CR 762.
The state followed its answer to the amended petition with an amended motion for
summary disposition. ln the amended motion, the state, without reference· to the 29 issues raised
by Gerry in his prose petition which was included in the amended petition, determined that the
amended petition raised only three claims for relief. The state listed those as: I) the judgment
and sentence were in violation of the state and federal constitutions; 2) prosecutorial misconduct;
and 3) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. With regard to the first two claims,
the state asserted that such claims could not be raised in post-conviction because they either were
or could have been raised in the direct appeal. With regard to the claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, the state again claimed, without reference to Gerry's lengthy pro se affidavit, that the
claim should be dismissed because it was not supported by an afiidavit, record, or other
evidence. CR 764.
A few days after the state's amended motion was filed, on April 11, 2006, the court heard
a motion to withdraw from Palmer. Palmer asked for permission to withdraw both because he
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was not capital certified, and because there would be an inequity in making him continue as.
counsel because he did not realize that the case was a capital case when he was appointed and
because the amount of work involved far exceeded that for which he was being paid under his
contract with the public defender. However, the court denied Palmer's motion. Tr. 4/11/06 p.
31-39.
Four months after the state filed its amended motion for summary disposition, Gerry
wrote a letter to the court asking that Palmer be removed from his case because he had made no
preparation to respond to the state's amended motion and because he had a conflict in
representing Gerry given his association with Kootenai County. CR 766.
This request was not granted and the matter proceeded to a hearing on summary judgment
on January 9, 2007. Tr. 1/9/07.
The first order of business at the hearing was a letter Gerry had sent to Palmer the day
before the hearing asking that Palmer withdraw from the case. Palmer moved for withdrawal
pursuant to the letter, but the Court declined to grant that motion, saying that Palmer could make
a more formal motion ifhe deemed it appropriate after the present hearing. Tr. 1/9/07 p. 3-5.
The state then made its argument for summary dismissal stating again that the only three
issues in the petition were an unconstitutional judgment and sentence, prosecutorial misconduct,
and ineffective assistance of counsel. Again, the state made no reference to the 29 claims Gerry
had raised in his prose petition. Tr. 1/9/07 p. 6.
The state asserted that the question of the constitutionality of the judgment and sentence
had been raised in direct appeal and so could not be raised again. The state next asserted that
even though prosecutorial misconduct was not raised in direct appeal, it should have been and so
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could not now be heard in post-conviction. And, lastly, it argued that the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel should be dismissed because Gerry had not alleged facts that would support
the claim. Tr. l/9/07 p. 6-7.

In response, Palmer argued that prosecutorial misconduct could be subsumed in the
ineffective assistance of counsel argument, because if there was misconduct it was ineffective
assistance to not raise it in direct appeal. He also asked that the issue of ineffective assistance
remain open because he was still investigating the factual basis for the claim. Tr. 1/9/07 p. 1415.

In its ruling, the Court stated that only four claims were before it: 1) unconstitutional
judgment and sentence; 2) prosecutorial misconduct; 3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel;
and 4) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In so doing, the Court did refer to Gerry's
original petition stating:

... It's very difficult to sort through Mr. Barcella's petition in this case. It was
my hope that we'd have it amended in some fashion where it would be a little
more legible and easy to grasp, but that hasn't occurred.
What has occurred, though, is we do have an amended petition in front of the
Court which refers and incorporates the original handwritten petition. And the
amended petition is a sworn petition by Mr. Barcella. So we have, basically a
sworn complaint in front of the Court.
Tr. 1/9/07 p. 16-17.
The Court then held that claims of an unconstitutional judgment and sentence and
prosecutorial misconduct were subject to summary dismissal. However, claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel were not be dismissed. Tr. l/9/07 p. 20, CR 771.
And, so on May 29, 2007, an evidentiary hearing began on Gerry's petition. And, at that
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hearing, the very first words from the state included, " ... ifthere ever was a succinct statement
of the issues, I haven't been able to find it, so I am a little unclear as to what the arguments are
going to be ... " Tr. 5/29/07 p. 3. And, just moments later, the state said, "I obviously have
some idea, but Mr. Barcella's pleadings in the matter were quite extensive, and it's a bit hard to
respond to the issues when I don't know exactly what the issues are going to be." Tr. 5/29/07 p.
5.
Palmer presented testimony from five witnesses. Two are most relevant for this appeal:
John Adams, who represented Gerry at trial, and Gerry.
Adams testified that while he understood that trial counsel cannot ignore a defendant's
constitutional right to testify and that the decision of whether to testify lies ultimately with the
client, he might have, in this case, denied Gerry the right to testify. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 167-169.
Adams further testified that he would not have allowed Gerry to voluntaiily waive the right to
counsel and not put it on the record, especially given this was a death penalty case, because
"that's how people die, so I wouldn't do that." Tr. 5/29/07 p. 175. Adams testified that if there
is no waiver on the record of Gerry's right to testify, the only explanation is that he did not in fact
waive that right. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 174.
Adains adamantly maintained that Gerry did not get a fair trial. According to Adams,
Gerry's trial was the most flawed, the worst, trial he had ever seen in his 27 years of criminal
defense work. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 149, 157.
Gerry gave lengthy testimony. Especially relevant to this appeal, Gerry testified that he
and Adams did not communicate well. In fact, as confinned by Adams, Gerry sent Adams 638
kites from the jail about the case. However, Gerry testified that Adams never responded to even
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one. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 116, p. 172. Further, Gerry testified that Adams had told him that he would
not allow Gerry to testify at trial, even though Gerry repeatedly told Adams that he wanted to
testify. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 122-124. And, indeed, in trial transcript, which extends over 1800 pages,
there is no record of Gerry ever waiving the right to testify. See Trial Transcript. See also, CR
827, where in the Opinion on Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, the Court writes," ... the
lengthy trial transcript does not appear to contain a specific waiver of Petitioner's right to
testify." Gerry also testified that he could not recall any colloquy about his right to testify
occurring either on or off the record. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 124.
Gerry also testified as to some of the substance of the case against him. He testified that
he had wanted to do a manslaughter type defense because he did not premeditate the killing of
Smith. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 136. He also testified that he wanted to testify because much of the
testimony the state offered at trial was lies and he wanted to rebut them. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 123.
With regard to the alleged offense, Gerry testified that all the motives suggested by the
state were invalid. He would never kill someone for putting a note on his door. Nor was there
any issue over a dog. And, he certainly would not have killed someone because they told him to
stop making noise. In fact, Smith had let Gen-y move into the apartment and had let him have a
dog. Rather than having bad feelings toward Smith, Gerry was grateful to him. Tr. 5/29/07 p.
125,129,201.
Gerry also testified as to the terrible time he was having immediately before Smith died.
Gerry had been in jail in Wall ace, and upon his release, he had lost the house he had been
buying. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 201. His dog had also died and he had been forced to move to Coeur
d'Alene, even though he did not really want to. He moved into the apartment, which was named
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Harmony House, but was really more like Animal House. People there were drunk and on drugs
and rum1ing up and down the hallways. One guy was even standing in the hallway swinging a 2
x 4 with nails and spikes in it and had to be arrested. Further, that week, Gerry was assaulted by
a homosexual and got into an altercation with some Gypsy Jokers, one of whom told him that he
was going to kill or severely maim him. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 203.
These events were all set over Gerry's pre-existing PSTD, alcoholism, and bipolar
disorder. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 205.

In the three years before Smith's death, Gerry had been sober. However, when he
moved to Idaho, he had started "controlled" drinking, wherein he would work out and then go
have a pitcher or two of beer. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 208.
On the day of Smith's death, Gerry was drinking and taking Xanax. 3 So, it was hard for
him to remember events clearly. However, either the day Smith died or the day before, he went
to the Cotton Club with Bill Solberg and they got drunk. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 208-209. Later that day,
his girlfriend, Ricki Bobo, took him shopping for some shoes and when they came back to his
apartment, there was a note from Smith on his door. But, the note did not upset Gerry and he just
took it from the door. The idea that this note was a motive for him to harm Smith was totally
false. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 210.
At any rate, Gerry was drunk for approximately four days prior to Smith's death. He was
also taking a "mega-dose" of Xanax, and this caused blackouts and memory loss. Tr. 5/29/07 p.
211-212.

3

Xanax, is used to treat anxiety and panic disorders. It acts on the brain and nerves by
enhancing the effects of GABA. Side effects include mental/mood changes, dizziness,
drowsiness, trouble walking, and slurred speech. www.webmd.com.
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Shortly before Smith's death, Gerry had received his SSI check and slipped his rent under
Smith's door. While he had been in the habit of working out, he did not go to the gym the day
Smith died because he was very depressed and alone. Instead, he continued drinking. Tr.
5/29/07 p. 213-214.
He went to the Lakers Cafe about 10:00 a.m. and stayed for a couple of hours. Ken
Tluift, whom he knew from the apartments, was there drinking. Gerry was leery ofTluift, but
because he was drinking, he lost sight of his morals and started drinking with him. After leaving
Lakers, he and Thrift went to T.W. Fishers and probably two other places, the Cantina and Tito
Macaroni's, and Gerry had a drink at each place. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 214.
At some point, Gerry went home. He cannot remember now ifhe continued drinking at
home, but at 5:30 p.m., he went to the Watering Hole. Thrift, David Overcash, and Solberg were
there and Gerry probably had about three or four more beers. While there, the bartender asked
Gerry to straighten out Overcash because he was calling her foul names. He agreed to help and
took Overcash outside, where he kicked him. They then went back inside and the bartender, in
thanks, bought Gerry more beer for the next couple of hours. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 215.
A couple of hours later Thrift and Bakey came in. Both were drunk. Bobo also showed
up saying she had been at the Cantina drinking. Meanwhile, Gerry was doing shots. He was so
drunk that at about 10:30 p.m., he froze up and could not walk. This made Bobo very angry and
she and Solberg carried Gerry out to Solberg's truck. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 216.
Geny can recall getting into the truck and going with Solberg to two other bars. At some
point, Bobo went home and Bakey and Tluift also left. Tr. 5/29/07 p. 217.
About 1:30 a.m. Gerry called Bobo. It was a "drunk's phone call" based upon Gerry's
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loneliness and depression. By then, he was very drunk and he and Solberg left the bar to return
to the apartment building. Tr. 5/27/07 p. 217-218.
Gerry can remember crawling into his room and Smith telling them that they could not
come in at two or three in the morning drunk. However, Smith too was a drinker and he didn't
yell at Gerry or anything. In fact, they had often interacted together at the bars. Tr. 5/29/07 p.
218.
Geny stayed in his room and drank another beer or two. At this point he had not slept for
four days. Tr. 5/27/07 p. 219.
After a bit, he heard some people in their early twenties down on the sidewalk making
noise, and he yelled at them to shut up. Gerry is not sure why, but he might have been afraid that
Smith would yell at him for the noise and he wanted to avoid trouble. At any rate, Gerry's room
was full of tools and he grabbed the pulakski and went down to talk to the kids. Tr. 5/27 /07 p.
219-220. He took the pulaski only to protect himself. He had no intent of hurting anyone. He
was highly intoxicated and had already been jumped and so wanted to protect himself. Tr.
5/30/07 p. 9.
This is the last thing Gerry can remember. Tr. 5/27/07 p. 220.
Some time later, Gerry woke up in Smith's room. Smith was dead and the pulaski was on
the floor between them. Tr. 5/27 /07 p. 220. Gerry was in a blackout period and does not know
how Smith died. Tr. 5/30/07 p. I 2.
Gerry got extremely scared and did not know what to do. So, he left Smith's room, went
into his own room, and had some more beer. Everything kept running through his mind and it
was terrible. Tr. 5/27 /07 p. 221,
12

Sometime between 5:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., Gerry and Thrift had another beer. Then
Thrift suggested that he (Thrift) hotwire Solberg's truck and that they go out for breakfast. They
did this and went to Denny's. Tr. 5/27/07 p. 221-222.
At Denny's, Gerry told Thrift and Bobo that he had killed Smith. 1n response, Bobo came
up with an idea to put a note under Smith's door asking for a rent receipt in order to deflect
suspicion from Gerry. Tr. 5/27 /07 p. 222.
After breakfast, Bobo brought her son to Gerry's apartment and Gerry continued drinking
throughout the day. Finally, Peter Cooper went into Smith's room and found Smith's body.
Cooper wanted someone to call the police, and after freaking out, Gerry remembered that Smith
was the only one in the building with a phone. So, Gerry told Cooper this, and Cooper called the
police. Tr. 5/27/07 p. 223.
When the police arrived, they declined to interview Gerry saying he was too drunk to talk
with. Gerry looked into the room, but he already understood what had happened. Tr. 5/27/07 p.
224.
Meanwhile, Bobo was freaking out and felt that it was not a good place for her 11 year
old son to be. So, he, Bobo, and the boy left. As they left, Gerry spoke with a police officer,
showing her his ID and asking ifit was OK to leave. Tr. 5/27/08 p. 225.
The three went to a motel and spent the night. The next day Gerry returned to the
apartment and was arrested on a federal weapons charge. Tr. 5/27/07 p. 225.
Gerry did not confess to killing Smith to the two informants who testified in the trial,
Lane and Agrifolio. Tr. 5/30/07 p. 16.
Gerry had no issues with Smith. He had no problems with him at all. Tr. 5/27/07 p. 229.
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In fact, Gerry has been waiting until the end of his case because he wants to put Smith's friend
Bob Healy's mind to rest by answering any questions he may have. Tr. 5/27/07 p. 229-230.
Gerry thinks about Smith every day and prays for him and his friends. Tr. 5/27 //07 p.
231.
Had Gerry been able to present the evidence he wanted at trial, the jury would have
learned that he had been in fights before, but they would have also learned the nature of the other
people involved. And, they would have learned that Gerry does not lie. Tr. 5/27/07 p. 232.
Gerry testified that if he had been allowed to testify at trial and admit that he had killed
Smith, the infom1ant testimony, which was full ofhonible lies, would not have been admitted.
Tr. 5/27 /07 p. 232. If Gerry had been able to testify at trial, he would have given the same
testimony that he gave at the hearing on his petition. Tr. 5/30/07 p. 7.
While Gerry took pride in his strength, there is no pride in killing an old man and he
would never do snch a thing in his right mind. And, while he had been in many fights before, he
has changed and no longer fights. All the fight has gone from him. Tr. 5/27/07 p. 232-233.
Following the hearing, the District Court entered a written opinion denying postconviction relief. The Court adopted the assumption that trial counsel did not allow Gerry to
testify and that for purposes of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984),
this was deficient performance. However, the Court further found that the deficient performance
did not prejudice Gerry because the outcome of the trial would not have been different ifhe had
been allowed to testify. The Court further held that there was no deficient performance in trial
counsel's failure to communicate with Gerry nor was there ineffective assistance by appellate
counsel. CR 820.
14

This appeal timely followed. CR 840.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
!. Given the vagueness of the state's motion for summary dismissal, did the District
Court err in summarily dismissing all issues except ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel without giving 20 days notice of the reasons therefore as required by LC.§ 19-4906(b)?
2. Even if the state's notice had been proper and the Court had been correct that Gerry
had raised only four issues and not twenty-nine, did the District Court err in summarily
dismissing the claims of an unconstitutional judgment and sentence and prosecutorial misconduct
as the issues could not have been raised on direct appeal as proof of the claims required
presentation of evidence outside the appellate record?
3. Did the District Court err in finding that trial counsel's error in prohibiting Gerry from
testifying in his own defense was not prejudicial given that with Gerry's testimony there was a
reasonable probability that the jury would have found Gerry guilty of manslaughter, but not first
degree murder, as his testimony established that he could not have formed the requisite intent for
first degree murder?

IV. ARGUMENT
A. Summary Dismissal Without 20 Days Notice of the Reasons Therefore as
Reguired by LC. § l 9-4906(b) was Erroneous Given the Vagueness of the State's
Motion for Summary Dismissal.
While petitions for post-conviction relief may be summarily dismissed if certain notice
requirements are met, I.C. § l 9-2906(b) and ( c), summary dismissal was not proper in this case
because the notice requirements were not fulfilled.
Summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is authorized under LC. § l 9-
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4906(b) and ( c). Those sections provide in pertinent part:
(b) When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion,
and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post 0conviction relief and no
purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may indicate to the parties
its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing. The applicant
shall be given an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. ..
( c) The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the
application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The reason for the 20 day notice requirement in subsection (b) is so that the petitioner
will have an opportunity to respond to the court's concerns. Sua sponte dismissals without the
20 day notice are not allowed. Saykhamchone v. State. 127 Idaho 319, 900 P.2d 795 (1995).
Further, when summary dismissal is sought by the state, the state is required to provide notice in
its motion of the specific grounds therefore. Id.
In Saykhamchone, the state filed an answer to a petition for post-conviction relief and in
the answer's prayer for relief asked the court to dismiss without further hearings. The Supreme
Court held that this document was not sufficient to give Saykhamchone notice of the grounds
upon which dismissal was being sought. The Supreme Court stated that" ... at a minimum the
state's prayer for relief in the Answer was deficient for not stating its grounds with particularity,
and for not stating that it was the state's motion for summary disposition under LC. §
19-4906( c)." 127 Idaho at 322,900 P.2d at 798 (italics in original). Therefore, summary
dismissal without 20 days notice from the court as to the reasons for dismissal was e1ror.
Anderson v. State, _

Idaho at_, _

P.3d at_, 2007 WL 322794 (Idaho App.

2007) at 7, rev. granted March 21, 2008, provides a succinct statement of the requirements for a
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motion for summary dismissal.

It is well established that a petitioner is entitled to notice and an opportimity to
respond before his petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed. J.C. § 194906(b ); Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,321,900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995);
State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487, 488-89, 632 P.2d 676, 677-78 (1981);
Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813,892 P.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1996). If the dismissal
is based upon the state's motion for summary dismissal, this requirement is met
only if the motion states with particularity the ground on which summary
dismissal is sought. Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322, 900 P.2d at 798;
Christensen, 102 Idaho at 488-89, 632 P.2d at 677-78. Broad and generic
contentions of deficiencies in a petition for post-conviction relief do not suffice.
Franck-Teel, 143 Idaho at 668-69, 152 P.3d at 29-30. Proper notice must refer to
specific allegations in the petition on a claim-by-claim basis, and specifically refer
to deficiencies in the evidence or additional legal analysis necessary to avoid
summary dismissal of the claim, Id. at 668, 152 P.3d at 29. See also, Crabtree v.
State, 144 Idaho 489,494, 163 P.3d at 1201, 1206 (Ct. App. 2006).

Anderson v. State, supra. See also, Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 149, 139 P.3d 741, 751 (Ct.
App. 2006),( "If the [state's] motion [for summary dismissal) is not specific, any dismissal
granted by the district court will be treated as a sua sponte dismissal subject to the notice
requirement of LC.§ 19-4906(b). Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 818, 892 P.2d 488,493 (Ct.
App. 1995).").

In this case, the state did move for summary judgment twice, once right after Gerry filed
his prose petition and again after Palmer filed the amended petition. However, neither motion
met the notice requirements of Saykhamchone, Anderson, Franck-Teel, Crabtree, and Murphy.

In its first motion for summary judgment, the state filed a two page answer which
included a blanket denial of all of Gerry's allegations, a denial that there were any material facts
not previously heard, and a denial that Gerry received ineffective assistance of counsel. At the
same time, the state also filed a motion for summary disposition on the grounds that Gerry had
filed no affidavit, record, or other evidence supporting his allegations. This document made no
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reference to Gerry's 249 page affidavit. CR 594.
Based on these documents which did not in any way specifically address even one of
Gerry's 29 claims or any of the statements in Gerry's lengthy affidavit, the state asked the court
to dismiss the petition. In no way did either of these documents "refer to specific allegations in
the petition on a claim-by-claim basis, and specifically refer to deficiencies in the evidence or
additional legal analysis necessary to avoid summary dismissal of the claim." Anderson v. State,
supra.
Later, the state filed an answer to the amended petition which incorporated its initial
answer, denied all the allegations other than those i;n paragraphs 1-9 and 11 of the amended
petition, and asked that the amended petition be denied.
The state followed its answer to the amended petition with an amended motion for
summary disposition. In the amended motion, the state, without reference to the 29 issues raised
by Gerry in his prose petition, which was included in the amended petition, determined that the
amended petition raised only three claims for relief. The state listed those as: 1) the judgment
and sentence were in violation of the state and federal constitutions; 2) prosecutorial misconduct;
and 3) ineffective assistance oftrial and appellate counsel. With regard to the first two claims,
the state asserted that such claims cannot be raised in post-conviction because they either were or
could have been raised in the direct appeal. With regard to the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the state again claimed, without reference to Gerry's lengthy prose affidavit, that the
claim should be dismissed because it was not supported by an affidavit, record, or other
evidence.
Again, these documents wholly failed to "refer to specific allegations in the petition on a
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claim-by-claim basis, and specifically refer to deficiencies in the evidence or additional legal
analysis necessary to avoid summary dismissal of the claim." Anderson v. State, supra.

In fact, rather than giving notice to Gerry and his counsel of the deficiencies.in the
petition, both the Court and the state made comments on the record to the effect that they had not
even identified what Gerry's claims actually were. The prosecutor stated, " ... if there ever was a
succinct statement of the issues, I haven't been able to find it, so I am a little unclear as to what
the arguments are going to be ... " Tr. 5/29/07 p. 3. And, just moments later, "I obviously have
some idea, but Mr. Barcella' s pleadings in the matter were quite extensive, and it's a bit hard to
respond to the issues when I don't know exactly what the issues are going to be." Tr. 5/29/07 p.
5. And the Court stated," ... It's very difficult to sort through Mr. Barcella's petition in this
case. It was my hope that we'd have it amended in some fashion where it would be a little more
legible and easy to grasp, but that hasn't occun-ed." Tr. 1/9/07 p. 16-17.
Just as in Saykhamchone, the vague documents filed by the state were not enough to put
the petitioner on notice of the reasons why dismissal was being sought and therefore not
sufficient to allow dismissal without 20 days notice from the court under subsection (b ).
Because proper notice was not given, the order summarily dismissing all of Gerry's
claims except ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be reversed and the matter
remanded for further proceedings on those issues.
B. The Claims of an Unconstitutional Judgment and Sentence and Prosecutorial
Misconduct Should Not Have Been Summarily Dismissed.
Even ifit is determined that the state's notice was sufficient and summary judgment was
appropriate on some of Gerry's issues, the issues of an unconstitutional judgment and sentence
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and prosecutorial misconduct should not have been summarily dismissed.
The District Court dismissed the claim that the judgment and sentence were
unconstitutional on the basis that the issue had been raised in direct appeal and therefore could
not now be raised in post-conviction. Tr. 1/9/07 p. 6.
The District Court did not make entirely clear its reasons for summarily dismissing any
claims of prosecutorial misconduct. The state had argued that prosecutorial misconduct is a
claim that cannot be raised in post-conviction because it can be raised in direct appeal. Tr.
1/9/07 p. 7. And, presumably, this was the argument accepted by the Court. The Court's
comments on the question were:
And, again, to the extent that any failure to properly deal with the prosecutorial
misconduct is an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, I think that that
certainly survives as part of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. And so I
think, basically, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as raised by Mr.
Barcella is the issue. that would be in front of the Court for the evidentiary
hearing. Any independent claim for prosecutorial misconduct or any independent
claim for unconstitutional imposition of judgment and sentence, I think, certainly
should be removed and summary disposition should be granted.
Tr. 1/9/07 p. 19-20.
LC. § 19-4901 (b) does establish that most issues which could have been raised on direct
appeal cannot be raised in post-conviction.
b) This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the
proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction. Any
issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and
may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears to the
court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or
otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the
reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence,
have been presented earlier. Except as otherwise provided in this act, it
comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other
remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or
20

sentence. It shall he used exclusively in place of them.
However, claims of an unconstitutional judgment and sentence and of prosecutorial
misconduct which are based upon allegations outside of the record on appeal are not claims
which could have been raised in direct appeal and are properly heard in post-conviction. State v.
Windsor, 110 Idaho 410,420, 716 P.2d 1182, I 192 (1985). See also, Raudebaugh v. State, 135
Idaho 602, 21 P.3d 924 (2001) and Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000), recognizing
that claims of prosecutorial misconduct can be properly raised in post-conviction.
Some of the allegations of an unconstitutional judgment and sentence in Gerry's prose
petition were based upon facts outside the appellate record, including claims that the jury relied
upon information not in evidence to convict, that the jury was improperly selected, and that the
jury had been contaminated by a prospectivejuror's comments. Any of these claims, if
established, would amount to an unconstitutional judgment against Gerry. However, they were
not and eould not have been effectively raised in direct appeal, and so should not have been
summarily dismissed. Id.
Likewise, any allegations ofprosecutorial misconduct offered by Gerry based upon
conduct which was outside the appellate record, including any claims of Brady' violations,
intimidation of witnesses, or tampering with evidence, which were not fully litigated in the
course of the trial, were proper claims for post-conviction relief and should not have been
summarily dismissed. For example, in his pro se petition, Gerry alleged that the prosecutors had
"perpetrated a fraud upon the Court tluough suborning false and perjured testimony, withholding
evidence, withholding exculpatory evidence, planting snitches, withholding convictions and

4

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963).
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criminal files of state's witnesses, bolstering false and perjured testimony, ..." CR 118. Issues
of the planting of snitches, the withholding of exculpatory evidence and many others alleged by
Geny would require presentation of evidence not already in the record.
Because not all the claims of an unconstitutional judgment and sentence and prosecutorial
misconduct could have been raised in the direct appeal, the order summarily dismissing those
claims should now be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. Id.
C. The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Prohibiting Gerry From Testifying
Was Prejudicial.
In its opinion the District Court adopted the assumption that trial counsel was ineffective
in denying Gerry his right to testify in his own defense. However, the Court also found that this
ineffective assistance was not prejudicial. This conclusion is incorrect, because had Gerry
testified, it is reasonably probable that the jury would have found him guilty of manslaughter
instead of first degree murder. And, even if the jury had still returned a verdict of first degree
murder, it is reasonably probable that on appeal the Court of Appeals would not have found the
three trial errors harmless.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show that
counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency was prejudicial. To show prejudice,
the petitioner must show that there was a reasonable probability that, without counsel's
unprofessional errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland v.

Washington, supra.
In this case, the District Court correctly found that in denying Gerry his constitutional
right to testify, trial counsel was ineffective. "It is assumed that trial counsel did not allow
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Petitioner to testify since there is no specific evidence regarding the reason that trial counsel did
not call Petitioner to the stand or of a waiver." CR 827. See American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice 4-5.2 (decision of whether to testify is ultimately for the accused
and not counsel to make).
But, the Court then went on to find that this error was harmless, stating that the jury had
considered lesser included offenses and rejected them and that even if the jury had heard Gerry's
testimony it would not have reached a different verdict. CR 828-829. In this, the District Court
erred.
The evidence presented at trial was summarized in State v. Barce/la, supra. According to
that summary, on the day Smith died, Gerry was drinking heavily and made threats to kill Smith.
Sometime in the middle of the night, Gerry went into Smith's room, killed him with the pulaski,
and left. He later told Thrift and Bobo that he had killed Smith. Further evidence was offered
that two infonnants independently heard Gerry confess sometime after the events.
At trial, a manslaughter instruction was given, but the jury declined to find manslaughter
and returned a verdict of first degree murder. Tr. 12/11/97 p. 1677.
In his testimony at his post-conviction hearing, Gerry testified that he had been drinking a

tremendous amount over the course of several days preceding Smith's death. In addition, he
testified to his post-traumatic stress disorder, his alcoholism, his depression, and his bi-polar
illness. Further, he told the Court that he had been taking a "mega-dose" of Xanax. He testified
to being so incapacitated by drugs and alcohol that at one point he could not walk and that he was
having periods of blackouts wherein he was unaware of what he was doing and had no memory
of what had transpired after the fact. Gerry told the Court that he had no issues with Smith and
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that his threats had been directed at others, not Smith. He also testified that he had grabbed the
pulaski to protect himself when he went to confront some college-age kids about noise they were
making. He then lost all awareness and later woke up on the floor next to Smith.
In the main, Gerry's testimony did not conflict with the evidence offered by the state at
his trial. At the trial, there was testimony as to Gerry's state of intoxication. There was ample
evidence that Smith died from being hit with an instrument like, if not identical to, the pulaski
Gerry owned.
What GeITy offered at the post-conviction hearing was evidence in addition to the state's
evidence. He offered evidence that he had not gotten away with prior killings. He offered
evidence of bis drug use and mental illness. Most importantly, he offered uncontroverted and
credible evidence of being in a blackout at the time Smith was killed.
In short, what Gerry offered was testimony which negated the element of specific intent
required for both first and second degree murder.
Murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human with malice aforethought or the
intentional application of torture. LC.§ 18-4001. First degree murder is murder which is
perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. LC. § 18-4003(a).
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human without malice and may be voluntary,
involuntary, or vehicular. LC.§ 18-4006. While first degree murder caITies penalties including
life imprisonment and death, the maximum term of imprisonment for manslaughter is 15 years.
l.C. §§ 18-4004, 18-4007.
Had GeITY testified at trial as he testified at the post-conviction hearing, he would not
have exonerated himself. However, he would have overcome some of the prejudice resulting
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from the informant's inapprop1iate testimony that he had gotten away with two prior shootings.
And, more importantly, he would have presented evidence which would have negated the
elements of malice and premeditation, taking his offense from that of first degree murder to
manslaughter.
The offense in this case occmTed in 1995. State v. Barcella, supra. At that time, LC.§
18-116 stated:
No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less
criminal by reason of his having been in such a condition. But whenever the
actual existence of any particular purpose, motive, or intent is a necessary element
to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jmy may take into
consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time, in determining
the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed the act. 5
Under this statute, the jury could have found that given Ge1Ty's extreme state of
intoxication attributable both to Xanex and alcohol, a state which included the inability to walk
at one point as well as repeated states of alcoholic blackouts, he was unable to form the specific
intent of either malice and/or premeditation. See, State v. Sprouse, 63 Idaho 166, 118 P.2d 378
(194 l ), "While voluntary intoxication is no excuse for the commission of felonious homicide, it
is to be taken into consideration in determining the existence or non-existence, on the part of the
accused, of malice aforethought, which distinguishes murder from voluntary manslaughter." See
also, State v. Miller, 65 Idaho 756, 154 P.2d 147 (1944), holding that in a prosecution for

murder, voluntary intoxication affects intent. See also, State v. Gomez, 94 Idaho 323,487 P.2d
686 (1971 ), holding that whether intoxication was of such a degree as to preclude the defendant

5

Effective July 1, 1997, I.C. § 18-116 was amended to hold the person charged with a
crime responsible for the crime even if she/he was voluntarily intoxicated or under the influence
of drugs at the time of the crime.
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from formulating the necessary malice was a jury question. See also, State v. Tucker, 123 Idaho
374, 848 P.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1993), holding the issue with respect to intoxication was whether the
defendant was so intoxicated that he was unable to form the specific intent necessary to commit
the offense as charged. See also, State v. Lopez, 126 Idaho 831, 892 P.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1995),
holding that intoxication may negate the element of specific intent.
Gerry's testimony would have been such that had the jury heard it, there was a reasonable
probability that he would have been convicted not of first degree murder, but rather of voluntary
manslaughter. Moreover, even if the jury had still convicted Gerry of first degree murder, it is
reasonably probable that the Court of Appeals would not have found the numerous trial errors
were harmless. In either event, prejudice did result from the ineffective assistance of counsel.
Strickland v. Washington, supra. Because the ineffective assistance of counsel was prejudicial,
the District Court order denying post-conviction relief on this issue must now be reversed.
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V. CONCLUSION
Because proper notice was not given, the order summarily dismissing all issues other than
ineffective assistance of counsel should now be reversed and the matter remanded for further
proceedings on those issues. In the alternative, because the issue of prosecutorial misconduct
could not have been raised in direct appeal, the order summarily dismissing that issue should
now be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings on that issue. And, in any
event, the order finding ineffective assistance of trial counsel but denying relief because no
prejudice was established, must now be reversed because as set out above, if Gerry had testified,
it is reasonably probable that the jury would have returned a verdict of manslaughter as opposed
to first degree murder.
Respectfully submitted this ':)1½'ay of January, 2009.

Attorneys for Gerry Barcella
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